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PRIVATE LAW STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
SHYAMKRISHNA BALGANESH*
INTRODUCTION
While scholars routinely question the normative significance of the
distinction between public law and private law, few—if any—question its
conceptual basis. Put in simple terms, private law refers to bodies of legal
doctrine that govern the horizontal interaction between actors, be they
individuals, corporate entities, or on occasion the state acting in its private
capacity.1 Public law on the other hand refers to doctrinal areas that deal with
vertical interaction between the state and non-state actors, wherein the state
exerts a direct and overbearing influence on the shape and course of the law. 2
The latter is epitomized by the areas of constitutional law, administrative
law, and criminal law, while the areas of contract law, tort law, property law,
and the law of unjust enrichment exemplify the former.
Underlying this basic distinction is an important institutional
dimension. Most areas that are treated as exemplifying private law are areas
of the common law, meaning that they are judge made in origin. Common
law rules continue to be policed and developed by courts incrementally, from
within the context of individual disputes. 3 Consequently, private law and the
common law are routinely treated as synonymous and analytically
coterminous with each other. While this characterization may have had few
problems in simpler times, the emergence of the modern administrative state
has served to render it grossly misleading in important respects.
*. Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Many thanks to Ryan Doerfler and
Bill Eskridge for helpful comments and conversations.
1. See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Just Relationships, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1395,
1397 n.2 (2016); Michel Rosenfeld, Rethinking the Boundaries Between Public Law and Private Law for
the Twenty First Century: An Introduction, 11 INT’ L J. CONST. L. 125, 125–26 (2013).
2. See, e.g., Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 1, at 1397 n.2; Rosenfeld, supra note 1, at 125–26.
3. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 4–7 (1991).
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Treating private law as subsumed entirely within the common law has
produced a critical blindspot for private law thinking. It causes discussions
of private law to overlook the role of the legislature in governing horizontal
legal interactions. 4 In numerous areas, statutory intervention has come to
supplement and modify common law rules. Indeed, several domains of
horizontal interaction between private actors are today governed entirely by
statutory law. While this neglect is for the most part seen in all common law
countries, in the context of the United States it has come to be further
entrenched by an influential development in post–World War II legal
thinking that has given it a superficial structural legitimacy. And this is the
reality that under the influence of the Legal Process school of thought, the
subjects of “legislation” and “statutory interpretation” have come to be
understood and theorized as public law subjects. By prioritizing form over
substance and thus focusing on the institutional origin of the law rather than
on its substantive content, this public law approach to legislation dominates
American legal thinking today. As such, it has served to turn private law’s
legislative blindspot into a serious threat to the very analytical significance
of private law thinking.
This Article is an attempt to describe the basis and consequences of the
disconnect between private law and legislation, both for private law
theorizing and legal thinking more generally. It does so by focusing on
“private law statutes,” legislation (and legislative provisions) that creates or
modifies rights and obligations between parties in their private capacities.
Private law statutes do more than merely create private causes of action.
While they create private causes, they do so on the basis of principles that
are specific to the horizontal interaction between parties, rather than entirely
for public-regarding policy reasons. While statutes in the areas traditionally
identified as private law remain obvious examples, the category extends to
altogether new domains as well.
Private law statutes are today well known in the United Kingdom (and
numerous other common law jurisdictions that follow the U.K. model), 5
4. For prior efforts to identify this shortcoming, see TT Arvind & Jenny Steele, Introduction:
Legislation and the Shape of Tort Law, in TORT LAW AND THE LEGISLATURE: COMMON LAW, STATUTE
AND THE DYNAMICS OF LEGAL CHANGE 1, 1 (TT Arvind & Jenny Steele eds., 2012); Kit Barker, Private
Law: Key Encounters with Public Law, in PRIVATE LAW: KEY ENCOUNTERS WITH PUBLIC LAW 3, 5–6
(Kit Barker & Darryn Jensen eds., 2013). For what is to date the only discussion of this in the U.S. context,
see Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Private Law in the Gaps, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1689, 1691 (2014).
5. Examples in this category include Australia, New Zealand, Canada, India, Singapore and other
members of the Commonwealth, consisting mostly of prior British colonies. See Howard W. Leichter,
The Patterns and Origins of Policy Diffusion: The Case of the Commonwealth, 15 COMP . POL. 223, 224
(1983) (describing the process of policy diffusion among members of the commonwealth, all former
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where statutory interpretation is far from being regarded as a purely public
law subject. Courts (and increasingly scholars) in these jurisdictions remain
willing to interpret and understand these statutes using private law principles
and ideas, without necessarily allowing considerations of form, structure,
and policy to override substance. This presents an interesting contrast to the
United States, where courts and scholars take the public law orientation of a
statute for granted and search exclusively for public policy considerations in
interpreting it, despite its content. 6 The contrast—between what is best
described as private law statutory interpretation and public law statutory
interpretation—offers helpful lessons for how U.S. legal thinking might
reorient its approach to statutory interpretation in order to recognize the
distinctiveness of private law statutes.
Part I begins with an overview of the dominant approach to legislation
and statutory interpretation in the United States, which views the subject as
a public law area. Part II then introduces the idea of private law statutes and
private law statutory interpretation. It describes the operation and
significance of private law statutes in the United Kingdom and contrasts the
approach to interpretation that courts adopt in interpreting them with the
approach adopted by U.S. courts on similar issues. Part III then moves to the
prescriptive and offers a few tentative suggestions for how U.S. courts might
develop an approach to interpreting private law statutes and provisions.
I. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AS PUBLIC LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES
While the subjects of “legislation” and “statutory interpretation” had
been in existence in U.S. legal scholarship since the nineteenth century, they
remained significantly under-theorized until the middle of the twentieth
century.7 To classical legal thinkers (“Legal Formalists”) legislation was at
best an imperfect source of law, given its political (and therefore
unprincipled) overtones. 8 And to the Legal Realists who came after them,
statutory interpretation promoted a variety of post-hoc rationalizations that
British colonies).
6. Pojanowski, supra note 4, at 1692 (“[M]uch scholarship on statutory interpretation, a field that
has also witnessed great theoretical development, considers itself to be operating in the realm of public
law.”).
7. For a useful account of this revival, see generally Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the
Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241 (1992) (discussing
the development of scholarship in legislation).
8. Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 34–35 (1983); Christopher C.C.
Langdell, Dominant Opinions in England During the Nineteenth Century in Relation to Legislation as
Illustrated by English Legislation, or the Absence of It, During That Period, 19 HARV. L. REV. 151, 152–
53 (1906).
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masked the indeterminacy of legal doctrine. 9
All of this changed with the advent of the Legal Process school of
thought, developed and advanced by Professors Henry M. Hart, Jr. and
Albert Sacks, which sought to develop the central insights of the Realists but
grounded it in a structural theory about law-making and state institutions.10
The Legal Process approach is routinely described as one of the most
influential approaches to “public law” in U.S. history, and as having charted
the direction of public law thinking for several generations. 11 Describing it
as a “theoretical watershed in [U.S.] statutory interpretation,” Professor Bill
Eskridge notes how Legal Process thinking advocated looking beyond
statutory text and legislative history in interpreting legislation. 12 Implicit in
their theory, according to Professor Eskridge, was a recognition that
statutory interpretation ought to be guided by a “public values analysis”—a
set of public law based background principles that guide the interpreter.13
Central to the idea of public values is the recognition that the law is driven
by conceptions of justice and the common good, rather than individualist or
private considerations unique to any individual or group. 14 The Legal
Process approach to statutory interpretation proved to be enormously
influential in the U.S. context post−World War II.
Critical to Legal Process thinking, especially in its application to
legislation, was the belief that underlying every statute was an overarching
collectivist “policy” or common purpose. 15 This policy or purpose was worth
discerning, explicating, and applying during the interpretive process—even
at the cost of other variables. Speaking of Professor Hart’s own theory of
statutory interpretation, two theorists of Legal Process thus note that he
“preferred practical, dynamic, policy-oriented applications of statutes over
legalistic, static, linguistically or historically oriented interpretations.” 16 He
9. Jerome Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 1259, 1266 (1947); Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules
or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 400 (1950).
10. See generally HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF THE L AW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994)
(providing an extensive overview of the nature, construction, and application of the law and in the process
developing a new theory of law).
11. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007,
1012–13 (1989).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1008 (“Public values appeal to conceptions of justice and the common good, not to the
desires of just one person or group.”).
15. See HART & SACKS, supra note 10, at 3; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The
Making of The Legal Process, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2043 (1994).
16. Eskridge, Jr. & Frickey, supra note 15, at 2038.
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also took the view that legislative interventions in statutes could form
arbitrary starting points, such that background principles could be
legitimately sacrificed. 17
This last point is particularly important for the analysis here, since it
suggests a few things of importance about this approach to statutory
interpretation. It tells us that an overarching “policy,” understood as the
overall purpose behind the statute, takes precedence over unarticulated
background principles, which merely represent the means needed to achieve
the purpose. The distinction between policy and principles is a well-known
if complicated one, made famous by Professor Ronald Dworkin. Professor
Dworkin understood a policy in terms of the law’s overall goals, which were
usually externally defined, in contrast to principles, which to him were to be
derived from within the law and its commitment to justice, fairness, or
morality. 18 The distinction is of some significance to private law theories,
wherein principles deriving from the horizontal interaction between parties
are seen as just as important (if not of greater normative import) than the
policy goals at hand.
Fidelity to an identified legislative policy was therefore the overarching
ideal of the Legal Process approach to interpretation. Quite naturally, this
also meant ignoring any principles enmeshed in the substantive content of
the law, when in conflict with such policy. The working of this public law
approach to interpretation is best captured by the first example that
Professors Hart and Sacks use to illustrate their theory: “The Case of the
Spoiled Cantaloupes.”19 While not offered (by them) as an illustration for
statutory interpretation, its deployment of the statute effectively captures this
policy-focused thinking within the domain of interpreting and applying
legislation. Drawn as it was from the context of an actual set of opinions, it
also aptly illustrates the approach to legislation that had become entrenched
by the time of their writing.
In 1930, Congress passed a federal law known as the Perishable
Agricultural Commodities Act (PACA). 20 Its principal provision made it
unlawful for “any dealer to reject or fail to deliver in accordance with the
17. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to The
Legal Process, in HART & SACKS, supra note 10, at lxxx (drawing these conclusions from a detailed
review of Professor Hart’s notes and papers).
18. See RONALD D WORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 82 (1978); Ronald Dworkin, The Model
of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 23 (1967).
19. HART & SACKS, supra note 10, at 10.
20. Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act (PACA), Pub. L. No. 71-325, 46 Stat. 531 (1930)
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 499a–499s (2018)).
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terms of the contract without reasonable cause any perishable agricultural
commodity” that had been entered into interstate commerce.21 Structurally,
it was therefore a law that was parasitic on (state) contract law and the terms
of the contract. A depression era legislation, the PACA was enacted to
protect vendors of perishable commodities against unfair dealings by
receivers, who had the ability to hold the vendors hostage given the
perishable nature of the goods at issue. 22 As a piece of economic legislation,
the PACA was therefore designed to produce a more efficient and egalitarian
marketplace. Yet at the same time, it was also a piece of contract law, in that
it merely added a federal remedy for the breach by simply providing that a
violation will result in “liab[ility] to the person or persons injured thereby
for the full amount of damages sustained in consequence of such
violation.”23
Professors Hart and Sacks use the case L. Gillarde Co. v. Joseph
Martinelli & Co.,24 which employed the PACA, to illustrate their theory. The
case involved a contract for the supply of cantaloupes of a certain quality,
sold under the term “rolling acceptance final.” When the vendor supplied
them, the recipient rejected them claiming that they were not of the specified
quality since they had been infected with rot, and the dispute that arose was
whether the rejection was lawful. 25 The vendor began the action by filing a
complaint with the Department of Agriculture, which ruled that the recipient
had no right of rejection. 26 The recipient then took the matter to the federal
courts. The district court treated the case as a simple contract law dispute and
applied the traditional principles of the law of sales. On that basis, it
concluded that the rejection was lawful since a rolling acceptance merely
required the recipient to accept responsibility for any in-transit damage or
deterioration. When the goods were not as described in the contract, the
implied warranties of description and quality were violated, which allowed
for the rejection.27
On initial appeal, at the First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
district court—but on purely contract law grounds—finding that under the
express terms of the contract, the recipient’s right to reject had been
21. PACA § 2(2), 46 Stat. at 532 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 499b(2) (2018)).
22. See J.W. Looney, Protection for Sellers of Perishable Agricultural Commodities: Reparation
Proceedings and the Statutory Trust Under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 23 U.C. D AVIS
L. REV. 675, 675–76 (1990).
23. PACA § 5(a), 46 Stat. at 534 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 499e(a) (2018)).
24. L. Gillarde Co. v. Joseph Martinelli & Co., 169 F.2d 60 (1st Cir. 1948).
25. Joseph Martinelli & Co. v. L. Gillarde Co., 73 F. Supp. 293, 294–95 (D. Mass. 1947).
26. Id. at 294.
27. Id. at 296.
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waived. 28 It concluded that in light of the breach of warranties, the recipient
was entitled to no more than a claim for damages sustained from the breach. 29
The respondent filed a petition for rehearing, which was supported by the
Department of Agriculture in an amicus brief. The Department advanced an
interpretation of the statute that consciously underplayed the role of general
contract law. Instead, it argued that as a matter of public policy, the court
ought to be more aware of how rejections of perishable commodities
impacted the market for them. Specifically, it emphasized that the court was
to pay attention to the “rejection evil,” which “was one of the principal
factors which led to the enactment of the” PACA. 30
Somewhat surprisingly, the First Circuit gave in and reconsidered its
decision. In its new opinion, it adopted an interpretation of the statute that in
many ways showcases the Legal Process-driven public law approach. The
new opinion said nothing of traditional contract law principles as it once had,
and instead focused on discerning the “intent[ion]” behind the statute, which
was the court’s term for the overall purpose and policy which had motivated
its passage. 31 The court bought the argument that the rejection “evil[]” was
of paramount importance, and accordingly signed on to the Department’s
interpretation, reversing its own decision on the availability of a damages
remedy. 32
While Hart and Sacks use the case to illustrate the working of their
overall theory of institutional settlement in the law, it is also a useful lesson
in the approach to statutes and legislation that they advance in the course of
their theory—and which has since come to dominate U.S. thinking since.
The straightforward private law question of whether a party was entitled to
seek damages for nonperformance even after wrongfully rejecting the goods
(discounting for the loss occurring from that wrongful rejection) was
rendered altogether irrelevant by a collectivist policy consideration that had
to do with the overall regulation of the market. It was not that the court
sought to balance the parties’ private considerations against broader public
ones, but instead that it allowed the latter to eviscerate the need for the former
altogether. Principles of basic contract law would have had the court focus
on the parties’ contractual intent or whether the contractual consideration
covered the claim at issue, or both. Yet none of that now mattered to the First
28. L. Gillarde Co., 168 F.2d at 280–81.
29. Id.
30. HART & SACKS, supra note 10, at 56–57 (reproducing portions from the brief filed by the
Department).
31. L. Gillarde Co., 169 F.2d at 61.
32. Id.
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Circuit once the public purpose behind the statute was seen to be paramount.
The case epitomizes the public law approach to statutory interpretation
that has since taken hold of U.S. legal thinking. The approach makes obvious
(and perfect) sense when the underlying substance of the legislation is
collectivist in orientation, such as it is with regulatory enactments. All the
same, when it involves horizontal interactions—most commonly in the form
of private causes of action—those interactions are seen as adding nothing of
normative import at all to the legislation. Instead, they are seen as mere
means to the overall public end.
With the elimination of federal general common law by Erie Railroad
Co. v. Thompkins,33 most U.S. federal legislation has come to be understood
almost exclusively in public law terms. The pervasiveness of this approach
is best captured by the following observations of the Supreme Court in a
1953 decision interpreting the provisions of a labor statute:
Statutes may be called public because the rights conferred are of general
application, while laws known as private affect few or selected individuals
or localities. . . . [The] distinction between public and private law is less
sharp and significant in this country, where one system of law courts
applies both, than in the Continental practice which administers public law
through a system of courts separate from that which deals with private law
questions. Perhaps in this country the most usual differentiation is between
the legal rights or duties enforced through the administrative process and
those left to enforcement on private initiative in the law courts.
Federal law has largely developed and expanded as public law in this latter
sense. It consists of substituting federal statute law applied by
administrative procedures in the public interest in the place of individual
suits in courts to enforce common-law doctrines of private right.34

The Court’s language here is telling and vividly showcases the two core
points previously made: (1) statutory law—especially federal law—is public
law, and (2) public (interest and) policy is paramount in the construction and
understanding of these statutes. Principles take a veritable backseat.
II. PRIVATE LAW STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The idea of statutory law as public law regardless of its substantive
content is today well ensconced in U.S. legal thinking. While public law
33. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“There is no federal general common law.”).
34. Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 494–96 (1953) (Jackson, J.) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted). It is worth noting that the Court’s observations in this quote appear analytically
unsophisticated and conclusory in nature. Yet, they likely reflect the dominant understanding of the time,
given the confidence with which the pronouncement was made.
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thinking is principally responsible for this reality, U.S. private law scholars
share a good deal of responsibility for it as well. In limiting their focus
principally to private law doctrine produced through the common law
method, private law scholars have done surprisingly little to challenge the
dominance of the public law view of statutes. This is despite the abundance
of what are best described as private law statutes: legislative enactments on
private law subjects (in other words, those dealing with the horizontal
interaction between parties) that seek to influence and mold the relationship
between parties using principles specific to their horizontal interaction rather
than entirely through collectivist ideals.
Ironically, private law statutes are today far more common in non-U.S.
common law jurisdictions including the United Kingdom, the birthplace of
the common law. And while courts and scholars in these jurisdictions do not
refer to such statutes by that name, they nonetheless understand, interpret,
and apply them in a way that is faithful to their substantive (private law)
content without defaulting into an overly deferential search for a collectivist
legislative policy. The remainder of this Part explores the divergence
between U.S. and non-U.S. thinking (namely towards statutory
interpretation) on the issue, even within the common law world. It does so
by examining how courts approach the interpretation of a U.K. statute that is
self-consciously within an area traditionally defined as private law (contract
law); and then by looking to another area (copyright law) that has in the
United States come to be understood as public law, in contrast with the
United Kingdom, where it is implicitly treated as a private law subject, and
comparing the interpretive approaches of U.S. and U.K. courts therein.
An important caveat about line drawing should be discussed before
proceeding further. The term “private law statute” refers not just to statutes
that are entirely private law focused but also to provisions within otherwise
sprawling statutes in which this private law orientation manifests itself. A
more precise term for these provisions might be “private law provisions,” yet
to avoid a multiplicity of terms the former is used to cover the latter as well.
Situations involving private law provisions within broader statutes present
their own set of line drawing and classificatory complexities, which this
Article does not address. In particular, the issue of how to deal with statutes
that are principally regulatory and policy driven in their orientation, but then
deploy private law thinking to realize their policy goals, presents its own set
of questions about the desirability of this public law/private law synthesis
and the effect of this interaction on the normative values that each body of
thought brings to the statute.
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A. THE [U.K.] CONTRACT (RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES) ACT OF 1999
A bedrock principle in the common law of contracts has long been the
doctrine of privity. 35 The doctrine was understood as precluding third
parties—who were not party to the actual contract—from being able to
enforce the contract, even if they had been expressly identified as such. 36
The logic for this prohibition was tied to the rule that non-parties obtained
neither benefits nor burdens from a contract that could be legally enforced. 37
In due course it also came to be tied up with the idea of contractual
consideration, such that some courts justified the prohibition on the basis that
the third party had given no consideration to the original contracting parties
to justify the conferral of enforceable rights on it. 38
Over the years, the principle was seen as unduly restrictive and of little
practical utility, especially in situations where all the parties involved had
actively wanted a third party to take some benefit from the contract. This was
especially true in cases involving maritime contracts, where parties
consciously try to extend contractual benefits to third parties involved in the
transportation chain. English common law courts thus began to craft tailored
exceptions to the general rule and in their decisions openly noted the
impracticality of the prohibition, when applied as a bright line rule. 39
35. For an overview of privity, see generally Robert Merkin, Historical Introduction to the Law of
Privity, in PRIVITY OF CONTRACT (Robert Merkin ed., 2000). The fundamental nature of the doctrine was
famously echoed by former Lord Chancellor Viscount Haldane in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v.
Selfridge & Co. [1915] AC 847 (HL) 853 (appeal taken from Eng.).
36. This rule was known as the “third-party rule;” for further discussion on this rule, see Stephen
A. Smith, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties: In Defense of the Third-Party Rule, 17 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 643, 644–45 (1997).
37. For a defense of the third-party rule, see id. at 645–49.
38. Id. at 644–45 (separating the “third-party rule” and the “consideration rule”); Merkin, supra
note 35, at 10–12.
39. See, e.g., New Zealand Shipping Co. v. Sattherwaite Ltd. [1975] AC 154 (PC) [10−14] (Eng.)
(holding that a shipping company was able to gain the benefit of exemption from liability for damage to
goods shipped even though it was not explicitly a party to the contract between a manufacturer and
purchaser and even though the contract did not specify consideration on the shipping company’s part in
exchange for such liability exemption because the consideration was implied to be the performance of
shipping services); Pyrene Co. v. Scindia Navigation Co. [1954] 2 QB 402 at 425–26 (Eng.) (finding it
would have made no sense to hold that a shipowner was not liable for goods not loaded when he was not
a party in a contract between a buyer and seller of those goods); The Mahkutai [1996] 3 All ER 502 (PC)
1–4, 13–17 (appeal taken from H.K.) (finding that the owner of goods could sue a sub-contractor despite
a lack of privity, but that an exclusive jurisdiction clause in the original contract between the owner and
shipping contractor was not binding on the owner in its suit against the sub-contractor); K.H. Enter. v.
Pioneer Container [1994] 2 All ER 250 (PC) 1–17 (appeal taken from H.K.) (finding by reference to
bailment law that an owner of goods could sue a sub-contracted shipping company for lost goods even
though the owner did not have privity of contract with the shipping company, but also finding that the
owner was held to an exclusive jurisdiction clause in the sub-contract because the owner’s contract with
the initial shipping company stipulated that its goods may be shipped by a sub-contractor “on any terms”
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After years of deliberation, Parliament enacted the Contract (Rights of
Third Parties) Act in 1999, based on the Law Revision Commission’s study
of the topic and its recommendations for reform through legislation. 40 The
principal aim of the law was to relax the rigidity of the privity rule for third
party beneficiaries. A short statute (of ten sections), its principal provision is
Section 1(1), which allows a third party to enforce a term of a contract “in
his own right” if the contract either expressly allows for such enforcement
or purports to confer a benefit on him. 41
A few things are noteworthy about the statute and its passage. Despite
having clear commercial effects on different sectors of the economy, in its
actual framing, it is sector neutral and couched in the abstract language of
contract law. Further, this is so despite the Commission study on which it
was based, which conducted an elaborate survey of the need for the law from
the perspective of various market sectors. 42
Despite dealing with contract law, an area traditionally classified as
private law, the Act could have been understood and interpreted in either
public law or private law terms. Under the public law rubric (characteristic
of Legal Process thinking), it could have been understood as a piece of
economic legislation directed at facilitating contractual arrangements
commonly seen in certain sectors—such as the shipping and transportation
industries—and therefore reflecting a grand bargain of sorts that balances the
multiple interests at issue. Then, when an interpretive question arises a court
would treat the bargain as the starting point for its identification of a policy
and arrive at an interpretation aligned with that policy and purpose. The First
Circuit’s amended opinion in the Gillarde case is a prime example of how
this might have happened, perhaps even inviting the intervention of federal
agencies dealing with contractual arrangements, such as the Federal Trade
Commission.
By contrast, in the private law approach, the Act would be understood
as itself driven by the contract law principle of prioritizing contractual intent
over all else absent concerns of morality or public policy. The legislation
would thus be seen as simply allowing contractual intent to override
concerns about privity and consideration, when abundantly clear—a simple
and the exclusive jurisdiction provision was not unreasonable).
40. Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, c. 31 (Eng.).
41. Id. at § 1(1)(a)–(b).
42. LAW COMM’N, C ONSULTATION PAPER NO. 121, PRIVITY OF CONTRACT: CONTRACTS FOR THE
BENEFIT OF THIRD PARTIES ¶¶ 4.1–.35 (1991), https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-prodstorage-11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2016/08/No.121-Privity-of-Contract-Contracts-for-the-Benefit-ofThird-Parties.pdf.
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rearrangement of horizontal contract law principles. The interpretive
approach accompanying this understanding would eschew any reference to
an external, or market, purpose or policy underlying the statute and defer to
contract law principles rather than a legislative policy, if any.
Indeed, scholarly analyses and interpretation of the Act have almost
uniformly treated the statute as a private law enactment and attempted to
analyze it using the rubric of contract law principles. 43 Even those critical of
the Act appear to concede that it is best understood as a principle-driven
legislation, and that attempting to understand it in terms of overarching
commercial policy is futile. 44 One private law scholar takes issue with the
statute’s deviation from the traditional rationales and principles for private
law liability in the common law, arguing that the mere reliance on
contractual intent is insufficient as an independent (principled) basis for civil
liability.45 Notably though, this scholar stops well short of identifying the
statute in anything but private law terms; to the contrary, his own criticism
is premised on the statute being a private law statute. 46
In the years since the enactment of the Act, the few courts interpreting
it have almost uniformly understood it in private law terms. The earliest
cases interpreting the principal provisions of the Act treated it as applying a
purely objective test of contractual intention, an established principle that the
statute was seen as incorporating. 47 In one notable case, a plaintiff relied on
the Act to claim that it was an identified beneficiary in a transfer agreement
between two corporations.48 The agreement had the transferee assume any
liabilities of the transferor, and made the transferee agree to complete any
outstanding customer orders. The plaintiff sought to argue that this satisfied
the statute’s requirement that the beneficiary be “expressly identified.” 49 The
court disagreed, and in so doing rejected a plausible argument grounded in
consumer protection policy, though noting that the “temptation” to accept
43. See Neil Andrews, Strangers to Justice No Longer: The Reversal of the Privity Rule Under the
Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, 60 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 353, 357–78 (2001); Catharine
MacMillan, A Birthday Present for Lord Denning: The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, 63
MOD. L. REV. 721, 723–38 (2000); Robert Stevens, Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, 120
L.Q. REV. 292, 292–306 (2004).
44. See Stevens, supra note 43 at 323 (noting how “the Act has left English law in an incoherent
state”).
45. Peter Kincaid, Privity Reform in England, 116 L.Q. REV. 43, 46–47 (2004).
46. Id. at 47. He nevertheless does suggest that the Act appears to be more concerned with
collectivist considerations than private law ones. Id.
47. Nisshin Shipping Co. v. Cleaves & Co. [2003] EWHC (Comm.) 2602 [10] (Eng.); Laemthong
Int’l Lines Co. v. Artis [2005] EWHC (Comm.) 1595 [13−14] (Eng.).
48. Avraamides v. Colwill [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1533 [3–5] (Eng.).
49. See id. at [13, 17].
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such logic was “great.”50 Instead, the court relied on the logic that the Act
was clear about the distinction between an identified and an unidentified
class, and sought to limit its relaxation of the privity doctrine to the former;
again, it kept with the idea that contractual intention was the principle at the
root of the legislation.
The Act thus illustrates the working of a statute that was selfconsciously designed as a private law statute and interpreted and understood
by courts and scholars as such. In dealing with the statute, courts’ and
scholars’ interpretive focus has been on the basis and logic for the private
cause of action brought by the third party, and for which they have made
primary resort to contract law principles, eschewing—at times
consciously—reference to collectivist goals and ideals.
B. U.K. AND U.S. COPYRIGHT LEGISLATION
Given that the Act of 1999 was in an area traditionally thought of as
private law to begin with, it may seem altogether unsurprising that courts
(and scholars) interpret it using private law ideas and principles.
Additionally, drawing a comparison to U.S. courts’ approach on similar
issues poses obvious difficulties since general contract law remains an area
beyond the purview of federal legislation except under rare circumstances
relating to national concerns (such as, the PACA). Highlighting the
divergence in interpretive approaches between U.S. and U.K. courts more
fully necessitates looking to an area that (1) presents comparable statutes in
both jurisdictions, and (2) is amenable to both public law and private law
interpretations such that the adoption of one over the other is a matter of
choice. Copyright law fits both criteria rather well and evinces this
divergence between the two jurisdictions.
The most recent copyright statutes in both countries were enacted
within a decade of each other, the U.S. Act in 1976, 51 and its U.K.
counterpart in 1988. 52 Both are elaborate pieces of comprehensive
legislation that build on prior statutes and case law. Covering the entirety of
copyright law in order to compare how courts have approached interpreting
the statute in the two countries is well beyond the scope of this Article.
Consequently, the discussion that follows focuses on two important domains
(both covered by the respective statutes) where this divergence is most
apparent: joint authorship and originality.
50. Id. at [18].
51. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (2018)).
52. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48 (Eng.).
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1. Joint Authorship
The phenomenon of multiple authorship is ancient; and yet copyright
law around the world has struggled to develop a coherent framework to
analyze the practice and accord it appropriate importance. All the same, it
remains an excellent example to compare public and private law thinking in
so far as it combines elements from contract law, tort law, and property law
within the overall skein of copyright law’s other normative ideals.
The U.S. copyright statute approaches joint authorship through the
nature of the work produced through the process, which it defines as “a work
prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions
be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” 53
The U.K. statute—the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act of 1988—does
something very similar and defines a work of joint authorship as “a work
produced by the collaboration of two or more authors in which the
contribution of each author is not distinct from that of the other author or
authors.”54
A notable distinction between the two provisions is that the former
expressly incorporates a reference to “intention” while the latter does not.
Unsurprisingly, this has caused courts to interpret the provisions differently.
All the same, one interpretation adopted an overt policy-driven public law
approach, while the other treated copyright like the private law institution
that it always was as a historical matter.
In the U.S. context, it wasn’t until the year 1991 that the provision
invited serious judicial scrutiny. In Childress v. Taylor,55 a case brought by
a producer of a play against its principal author wherein the former claimed
to be a joint author of the play, the Second Circuit was called to interpret the
statute’s requirements for joint authorship. In so doing, the Second Circuit
concluded that most of the statutory definition of the idea was
“straightforward” except for its emphasis on intention, 56 for which it looked
to the legislative history accompanying the enactment of the 1976 Act, which
noted that “the touchstone [in the definition] is the intention, at the time the
writing is done, that the parts be absorbed or combined into an integrated
unit.”57 Using this language, the court then concluded that the requirement
of intention was so overarching that a collaboration as such was insufficient
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 § 10(1).
Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 501 (2d Cir. 1991).
Id. at 505.
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 120 (1976)).
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to generate joint authorship unless the requisite intention could be
independently proven. 58
The court’s rationale for this interpretation was to avoid joint authorship
being extended to “many persons who are not likely to have been within the
contemplation of Congress” because it would allow an individual making a
minimal contribution to the work to unfairly claim an “undivided half
interest” in the work.59 This last set of considerations had little to do with the
nature and form of the collaboration at issue, the process through which the
work was created, or indeed the text of the statutory provision; it was instead
motivated by an important policy consideration: avoiding contributors from
overreaching in their claims, which would itself deter additional
collaboration and joint authorship. This higher threshold—in the nature of
proof of intention—was thus meant to send a signal for the future.
The court’s interpretation was thus driven by its identification of a
policy-rationale, and was overtly collectivist in orientation in that it was
more about Congress’s presumptive concerns with contributor overreach.
Missing altogether in the opinion, even if intention were taken as central to
the provision, was any reference to what such intention was meant to serve
and its role as a mechanism of evidencing a common design, a consensus ad
idem, which is an idea well developed in contract law.
The Childress opinion is to be contrasted with how courts in the United
Kingdom have interpreted the definition of a joint work under the 1988 Act.
In a 2003 case, Hodgens v. Beckingham,60 the Court of Appeals was asked
to consider introducing the idea of intention into the definition, as an implicit
requirement underlying the idea of a collaboration. Specifically, the court
was asked to follow the example of Childress.61 It balked at the idea, noting
that the logic of Childress was entirely policy-driven, and premised on the
belief that the U.S. Congress would have wanted to limit joint authorship.
U.K. courts, the Court of Appeals concluded, were to limit themselves to the
statute and principles implicit within it, rather than delving “into the
uncertain realms of policy.”62
Rejecting a policy-driven approach, as the U.K. courts have, is a far cry
from suggesting that they instead do no more than apply the plain text of the
provision. To the contrary, U.K. case law has embellished the statutory
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 505–06.
Id. at 507.
Hodgens v. Beckingham [2003] EWCA (Civ) 143 [11] (Eng.).
Id. at [52].
Id. at [53].
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definition as well, but in doing so has looked entirely to principles internal
to the idea of joint authorship and collaborative design. The High Court
decision of Martin v. Kogan63 offers a useful contrast in so far as it addressed
the same question as Childress, namely whether there needed to be a
sufficiency threshold for a contribution to qualify for joint authorship. In
answering that in the affirmative, the court chose to look at the idea of
authorship and derive from it the principle that each type of work (literary,
artistic, etc.) had a “primary skill” associated with its creation, and that for a
joint work each author had to contribute a substantial amount of primary
skill. 64 While “secondary skills” did not imply the absence of joint
authorship, they nevertheless made its occurrence difficult owing to
evidentiary reasons relating to copyright’s protectability doctrines. 65 The
court in Martin also emphasized that joint authorship was related to the idea
of co-ownership, but that as with co-ownership there could well be disparate
shares of ownership involved, which required an apportionment. 66
Relying thus on principles drawn from (1) the nature of authorship (the
skills involved), (2) the connection between authorship and ownership (the
apportionment), and (3) the centrality of copyright’s protectability rules (the
secondary skills and substantiality), the court arrived at nearly the same place
as Childress. Yet, its logic was principle-oriented, driven by the interior
design of authorship and ownership, and eschewed any reference to a
collective legislative design that it was merely seeking to give effect to for
the collective good.
2. Originality
The doctrine of originality is copyright’s most important protectability
requirement. While initially a creation of courts in both countries (the United
States and United Kingdom), the doctrine was later incorporated into their
respective copyright statutes—with the understanding that courts could
continue to develop it incrementally and contextually as they had before. As
a formal matter, originality today therefore derives from these statutes but
affords courts significant interpretive leeway—akin to common law
statutes. 67 This dimension injects an additional point of interest into the
comparison.
63. Martin v. Kogan [2017] EWHC (IPEC) 2927 (Eng.).
64. Id. at [44–49].
65. Id. at [51].
66. Id. at [53].
67. Common law statutes are those that delegate lawmaking to courts. See Frank H. Easterbrook,
Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. C HI. L. REV. 533, 544 (1983).
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The U.S. Act of 1976 accords copyright protection to all “original
works of authorship.” 68 The absence of a definition in the statute was
intended to allow for the incorporation of the extant judicial understanding
of the term. 69 The originality doctrine had evolved in different ways over the
lifetime of American copyright law,70 but under the 1976 Act it received its
most elaborate treatment and interpretation by the U.S. Supreme Court in the
case of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. 71 Feist
showcases the dominance of the public law approach to statutory
interpretation and construction and a rather complete disregard of private law
ideals during that process.
Feist involved the question of whether a telephone directory was
copyrightable when it was nothing more than a compilation of facts. In a
pathbreaking move, the Court departed from the doctrine as it had been
understood previously and added a requirement of “minimal creativity” to it,
noting that “[o]riginal . . . means only that the work was independently
created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it
possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.” 72 The Court’s logic
for this interpretation, which it drew from past precedent, was the text of the
Constitution.73 Reading the Constitution’s mandate that copyright “promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” the Court concluded that an
originality requirement that focused on a minimal level of creativity and
eschewed a bare reliance on creative labor was essential. 74 The Court’s
construction was therefore “the means by which copyright advances the
progress of science and art.”75
Feist’s invocation of the Constitution to interpret originality in a
manner that denies protection to pure works of information has been
understood as “implement[ing] a policy favoring general, free access to
disclosed data,” and seen as driven by an impulse to reorient law-making
68. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018).
69. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976).
70. For a wonderful historical account of this evolution, see Oren Bracha, The Ideology of
Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and Liberal Values in Early American Copyright, 118 YALE L.J.
186, 200–24 (2008).
71. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 355–61 (1991). For commentary on
the case, see generally Howard B. Abrams, Originality and Creativity in Copyright Law, 55 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1992); Jane C. Ginsburg, No "Sweat"? Copyright and Other Protection of Works
of Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338 (1992); Jessica Litman, After Feist,
17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 607 (1992).
72. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (citation omitted).
73. Id. at 346 (“Originality is a constitutional requirement.”).
74. Id. at 349–50 (citation omitted).
75. Id. at 350.
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power between Congress and the courts. 76 Leaving aside the merits of the
actual originality standard set out in the opinion, Feist’s decision to look to
the primary source of public policy (the Constitution) for guidance, rather
than to copyright’s internal principles is quite telling. In constitutionalizing
an established copyright law doctrine, it effectively confirmed the primacy
of copyright policy (as defined in the constitution) over any of the doctrine’s
underlying principles: a rather direct and bold instantiation of the Legal
Process approach.
Just what might those principles have been instead? For that, we merely
have to look to how U.K. courts have approached the question. Since the
early twentieth century, U.K. courts have consistently held that originality in
copyright law was primarily a question of individual skill and effort in the
production of expression.77 As long as an author applied skill and labor in
the creation of a work, such that it might be said to have originated with that
author, the standard was satisfied.78 This approach might be understood to
embody the principle of “skill and effort origination” emanating from
copyright’s fundamental idea of authorship, predicated on the connection
between creator and work. 79 The approach consciously abandons any
assessment of the merits of the work, which the Feist court implicitly
adopted in its emphasis on the work showing a minimal amount of creativity.
U.K. courts have had little problem applying this interpretation of
originality to the Act of 1988. They have extended it to databases as well,
emphasizing that the test involves assessing the “process of creation and the
identification of the skill and labour that has gone into it.”80 Once significant
effort, skill, and time are seen to have been applied in the process of creating
a work, the requirement is seen as satisfied since the individual has
effectively become the author of the work. Under the influence of E.U. law,
courts have insisted that the standard requires that the work bear the imprint
of the author’s “own intellectual creation,” which does not modify the prior
standard significantly. 81 If anything, it reiterates the “skill and effort
76. Ginsburg, supra note 71, at 339.
77. See, e.g., Ladbroke (Football), Ltd. v. William Hill (Football), Ltd. [1964] 1 All ER 465 (HL)
470 (Eng.); Univ. of London Press Ltd. v. Univ. Tutorial Press Ltd. [1916] 2 Ch 601 at 609–10 (Eng.);
Walter v. Lane [1900] AC 539 (HL) 542–43 (Appeal taken from Eng.).
78. Andreas Rahmatian, Originality in UK Copyright Law: The Old “Skill and Labour” Doctrine
Under Pressure, 44 I NT’L REV. INTELL. PROP . & COMPETITION L. 4, 13 (2013) (noting how the
jurisprudence describes this as the “personal touch” requirement).
79. For more on this connection and its normative dimensions, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh,
Causing Copyright, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 11–34 (2017).
80. Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd. v. Meltwater Holding BV [2010] EWHC (Ch) 3099 [71]
(Eng.).
81. Rahmatian, supra note 78, at 25–29.
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origination” principle that the U.K. originality doctrine has been crafted on.
In practice and application, little may turn on the difference between the
two countries. Yet, it represents a fundamental divergence in the
interpretation and understanding of the doctrine. In theory, a work (such as
the telephone directory in Feist) could be denied copyright protection in the
United States for being insufficiently creative in its result, while it would
obtain protection in the United Kingdom for reflecting the skill and labor of
its compiler in its process of creation. And the former outcome would have
been driven by the policy of using copyright to promote the progress of the
sciences and useful arts, while the latter would remain rooted in the
principles of authorship, skill and effort origination that it embodied.
Leaving aside which one is preferable, the methodological divergence in
approach is obvious.
***
The copyright statute is thus for the most part treated as a private law
statute in the United Kingdom (and indeed in most other common law
countries), where the rights of the individual creator and his or her
interactions with others forms the focal point of the analysis, and from which
doctrines are interpreted and expounded on in a principled manner. Courts
do of course occasionally look to the broader socio-economic objectives of
the law—its policy—in their analysis, but rarely ever do they either start with
this policy in their interpretation of the law, or let the policy override existing
principles. In the United States, the opposite is true. The law’s overarching
goals—often drawn from congressional reports accompanying the
legislation, economic theory, or the text of the Constitution—operate as
starting points for the analysis and often function as complete substitutes for
principles. While it would be a far cry to suggest that this has had the effect
of converting U.S. copyright law into an area of public law, it is certainly the
case that interpretations of the U.S. copyright statute readily partake of the
Legal Process phenomenon of public law statutory interpretation, which has
an overtly collectivist orientation rather than one that is individualist and
focused on the author’s rights and allied obligations.
III. PRIVATE LAW VALUES IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Obviously, the methods of private law statutory interpretation merit
application to statutes when the interpreter determines that the statute
incorporates ideals and values from private law thinking. This is most likely
to be the case when (1) the statute creates a private cause of action for a new
wrong, or (2) is parasitic on an area of the law traditionally understood as
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private law in orientation.
It bears emphasizing that a statute need not abjure all collectivist ideals
for courts to see it as incorporating private law elements. This is especially
true of statutes that fall under the first category above, involving the creation
of a new wrong and corresponding private cause of action. Antidiscrimination statutes, such as Title VII, are good examples here. Deriving
from the constitutional goal of equality, the statute works by creating a
private wrong and rendering it actionable by the individual harmed. The
collectivist ideal at its heart interacts with the private harm and wrong that it
identifies to produce a confluence of normative ideals, and interpretations of
the statute would do well to avoid ignoring the private law ideals that it
incorporates.82
This then brings us to the obvious task of identifying these “private law
values” that interpretations of private law statutes and provisions should pay
attention to. The remainder of this Part provides a brief overview of three
such values, and while more may indeed exist these three remain central to
the functioning of private law statutes and are worthy of recognition in the
interpretive process.
A. REDRESSIVE AUTONOMY
A hallmark of numerous statutes is their allowance for a private cause
of action, when a breach of a statutory obligation or directive results in harm.
Civil rights legislation, 83 antitrust law, 84 qui tam statutes, 85 intellectual
property statutes, 86 environmental legislation, 87 just to name a few, all
embody important private actions that afford parties a mechanism of civil
redress against wrongdoers. As a general matter, these provisions have been
understood almost entirely in public law terms, as embodying what scholars
have long described as a mechanism for a “private attorney general” which
is generally defined as “a plaintiff who sues to vindicate public interests not
directly connected to any special stake of her own.” 88 This definition
captures the collectivist stance in the understanding of private enforcement
82. For an important account making this move and emphasizing the role of private law, and
considerations of individualism in discrimination law, see Sophia Moreau, What is Discrimination?, 38
PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 143, 145–47 (2010).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2018).
85. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2018).
86. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2018); 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2018).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2018).
88. See Trevor W. Morrison, Private Attorneys General and the First Amendment, 103 MICH. L.
REV. 589, 590 (2005).
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provisions, which are thus seen as doing nothing more than allowing an
individual to stand-in for the state and enforce collectivist ideals and
concerns. In this understanding the state is seen as using private individuals
as a mere means towards its collective end, and that use (so to speak) adds
no normative content of its own.
As should be apparent, this approach denies altogether the autonomy of
the private individual in the overall skein of the statute. By assuming that the
right set of monetary incentives will motivate actors to bring actions
whenever there is a sufficient recovery at stake, it undervalues the complex
set of motivations that ordinarily accompany a private lawsuit and the claims
made therein. 89 In other words, it fails to recognize that there could well be
reasons—deriving from the horizontal relationship that a private action
entails—for an individual to bring or forego a private action even when there
is a clear basis for recovery. Sometimes the norms of human interaction
involve tolerating otherwise clear breaches of the law, for relational
reasons.90 And in so doing, the toleration produces its own set of norms that
make their way into conventional morality. 91
A private law approach to such private enforcement provisions would
instead recognize the intrinsic autonomy of the private actor involved, a form
of autonomy best described as “redressive autonomy.” Recognizing this
autonomy would in turn allow the analysis to move away from the banal
treatment of such actions as driven entirely by public interest considerations.
It would instead acknowledge the complex relational dimensions involved
in the action and the set of norms and values at stake in such actions, which
may not be to the exclusion of the public interest but can at times certainly
influence or modulate it.
B. INDIVIDUATION OF DIRECTIVES
Individuation refers to the idea that private law, at its core, operates by
creating individual private rights and obligations. They are private in the
sense that they have a normative existence that is analytically independent
of the state and they operate relationally between parties at the horizontal
89. Much of this thinking relies on the idea of a rational actor motivated entirely by individual
self-interest, measured in terms of costs and benefits. See SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE:
PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 3, 23–24 (2010).
90. This is the premise of an idea in copyright law that identifies a set of exceptions produced
entirely by creators tolerating acts of infringement by choosing not to enforce them, for a variety of
different reasons. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Uneasy Case Against Copyright Trolls, 86 S. CAL.
L. REV. 723, 752 (2013); Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 617, 633–34 (2008).
91. Balganesh, supra note 90, at 760.
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level. Private law statutes thus work by creating rights and duties between
parties. Yet, after such formal creation, these rights and duties operate
between the parties on their own quite independently of the state—through
market and non-market interactions and other forms of interpersonal
relationships. An exclusive focus on statutes as nothing more than
embodiments of collective ideals ignores the centrality of such individuation
that statutes can indeed produce.
Individuation can emanate from a statute, when it is the starting point
for an area of law such as it is with copyright. Here, the statute sets up a
framework of author’s rights and copier’s obligations; yet thereafter authors,
copiers, and other actors interact and deal with each other on a regular basis
without the direct involvement of the statute or the state. 92 To be sure, this
doesn’t mean that the possibility of state action doesn’t loom large over such
interactions, just that the interactions assume a life of their own at the
individual—rather than collective—level, which is of the missed in the
public law approach to interpretation. At other times, a statute may be
parasitic on a pre-existing set of interpersonal interactions. Legislation in the
domain of contract law is a good example. 93 Here, readings of the statute
again need to be sensitive to the individuated substructure that they are
premised on and the manner in which that individual interaction is likely to
be affected and impacted by its terms.
To be clear, recognizing the importance of individuation in private law
statutes does not require jettisoning collective ideals and goals in the
interpretive process. Instead, it recognizes a separate set of messages that the
provision communicates to actors shaping their lives and interactions around
the statute’s rights and responsibilities that operate at the level of the
individual.
C. PRINCIPLED HORIZONTAL COHERENCE
A third value of importance involves the repudiation of an idea that was
central to Professor Hart’s thinking about statutes—namely, that they could
operate as arbitrary “starting points” for the interpretation. 94 In other words,
92. Undoubtedly, they do so in the shadow of the law. Cf. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950–52
(1979).
93. Such as it was with the Uniform Commercial Code, which built on existing contract law rules
and self-consciously enabled courts to continue to develop common law rules in its domains. For a fuller
account, see Roger J. Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common-Law Orbits, 17 CATH. U. L. REV. 401,
421–23 (1968).
94. Esrkidge Jr. & Frickey, supra note 17, at lxxx.
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the public law approach assumes that the statutes can identify their own
purposes and values (policy), which need to be taken at face value given the
supremacy of the legislative as law-making body. Private law statutory
interpretation would question this and instead operate on the assumption that
the legal directives at issue operate to govern a set of horizontal relationships
or interactions, and that they are to be understood and interpreted using
principles and values that derive from that horizontality.
A hypothetical example might illustrate this idea. Assume that
tomorrow Congress decides to amend the U.S. copyright statute to introduce
a provision that defines originality by merely saying, “a work is original if it
is created by the author.” On its face now, in plain terms originality requires
creation. A court—such as Feist—reading it in public law terms and looking
to the Constitution could interpret the idea of “created” to require an
examination of some minimal creativity on the face of the work for it to
obtain protection. A private law approach that takes the horizontal coherence
of copyright’s authorship ideal seriously would instead seek to render the
definition compatible with the law’s understanding of authorship and its
principles for identifying who an author is in different contexts. This
interpretation would merely see the originality standard as a continuation of
the system’s emphasis on author’s rights.
The idea of principled horizontal coherence builds on Professor
Dworkin’s idea of “law as integrity” but in a limited manner. 95 It seeks
integrity in the set of ideas and principles underlying the particular private
law area at issue and not beyond, but takes seriously the idea that such
interpretation must operate as a chain novel, rather than allowing for each
provision to become an arbitrary and independent starting point each time. 96
CONCLUSION
Statutory law is today ubiquitous and an undeniable reality of the
modern state. Private law theory and thinking would do well to pay greater
attention to statutory law. This is especially true in the United States, where
statutory interpretation has come to be co-opted by public law thinking, such
that the idea of private law statutes remains something of a novelty. As this
Article has shown, this is less true in other common law countries, especially
in the United Kingdom, where the common law has come to be either
codified or supplemented by legislation, or both. The effect of this neglect in
95. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 226 (1986).
96. The “chain novel” metaphor was used by Professor Dworkin in his description of law as
integrity. Id. at 229–32.
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the United States is that statutory subjects that deserve to be understood—
even if only partially—through private law ideas never really obtain such
treatment.
Solving this problem in U.S. legal thinking is obviously more complex
than it might seem. Among other things, it involves uprooting decades of
skepticism about the distinctiveness of private law, while challenging the
general dominance of public law thinking in all areas of American legal
scholarship. While that remains a tall order, an important first step remains
having courts and scholars acknowledge the existence of independent private
law values that are worthy of incorporation into the exercise of statutory
interpretation. And for this, they would do well to acknowledge the
divergence between U.S. and non-U.S. legal thinking on this matter and
recognize the shortcomings of U.S. exceptionalism in this area.

